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ESSAY 
 
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS AND THE  
PSYCHOLEGAL ERROR  
MORRIS B. HOFFMAN†
INTRODUCTION 
 
It has been more than a decade since I began railing against the 
therapeutic jurisprudence movement in general and drug courts in 
particular.1  Much has changed in the world of therapeutic courts in 
that decade.  Every two-stoplight town now has a drug court, and every 
three-stoplight one, a veterans court.2
 
†
District Judge, Second Judicial District, State of Colorado; Member, The John D. 
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation’s Research Network on Law and Neuros-
cience; Research Fellow, The Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research; Ad-
junct Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School.  I want to thank Professor 
Stephanos Bibas for inviting me to participate in this sentencing symposium, and the 
staff of PENNumbra for all their help with this essay. 
  Every town big enough to claim 
to be a community must have a community court.  And every court eve-
rywhere dealing with low-level crimes must be called a “problem-solving 
court.”  I guess that makes my felony court a “problem-creating court.” 
1
See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, Commentary, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. 
REV. 1437, 1440 (2000) [hereinafter Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal]; see also Morris 
B. Hoffman, A Neo-Retributionist Concurs with Professor Nolan, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1567, 
1567-71 (2003); Morris B. Hoffman, The Rehabilitative Ideal and the Drug Court Reality, 14 
FED. SENT’G REP. 172, 172-77 (2002); Morris B. Hoffman, A Reply to Messrs. Meyer and 
Ritter, 14 FED. SENT’G REP. 186, 186-87 (2002); Morris B. Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and Judicial Collectivism:  The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes 
Most Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2063, 2083-85 (2002); Morris B. Hoffman, Drug 
Courts Don’t Work, USA TODAY, Oct. 21, 2008, at 10A. 
2
I suggested to my chief judge recently that our newly minted veterans court, 
which we deftly shuffled off onto our drug court, which in turn we deftly shuffled off 
years ago onto our lower-level courts, be divided between an officer’s court and an en-
listed man’s court.  No word back yet. 
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Much, though, has stayed the same in those ten years.  Most of 
these courts still do not “work” by any reasonable recidivism-based 
measure of that term; they often make things worse by many reasona-
ble measures.  Their therapeutic subset relies on a whole addiction 
industry that is more snake oil than science or medicine, populated 
largely by recovering addicts rather than trained behavioral profes-
sionals.  These courts have changed parts of the judiciary from a co-
equal branch of government to a bureaucratic thirteenth step along a 
road to social recovery. 
But we just celebrated Thanksgiving, my favorite of all holidays, so 
I have decided not to dwell on these negatives.3
Part of the impetus is the simple desire not to be the last kid on 
the block without one.  This is a version of the rush to the bottom 
phenomenon that we have seen with presumptive drunk driving blood 
alcohol levels plummeting nationally, or really with any legislative re-
sponse to the social problem du jour.  But at least these legislative res-
ponses are legislative.  We expect the vicissitudes of politics to drive leg-
islation.  By contrast, the therapeutic jurisprudence movement has 
almost exclusively been judge-driven.  Yet the politics of problem-
solving courts are just as bare-knuckled as attempts at legislative solu-
tions.  Mental health advocates, veterans’ groups, and special interest 
  Instead, I want to ex-
amine the question of why it is that these kinds of courts appeal to so 
many otherwise perfectly sane and insightful people, and especially to 
sane and insightful judges.  There seem to be several explanations. 
 
3
 Besides, the problem-solving machine has persisted despite a fairly robust body 
of criticism.  See, e.g., JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE:  THE AMERICAN DRUG 
COURT MOVEMENT (2001) [hereinafter NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE]; Richard C. 
Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1205, 1252-69 (1998) (discussing the challenges defense attorneys face defending 
clients in drug treatment court); Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. 
REV. 783, 786 (2008) (arguing that drug courts are least effective at helping the people 
they are designed to help the most—genuine addicts); Tamar M. Meekins, “Specialized 
Justice”:  The Over-Emergence of Specialty Courts and the Threat of a New Criminal Defense Pa-
radigm, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 47-50 (2006) (highlighting concerns of losing the de-
fense attorney as advocate in problem-solving courts); James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining 
Criminal Courts:  Problem-Solving and the Meaning of Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 
1554-62 (2003) (investigating the unexpected consequences of problem-solving 
courts); Mae C. Quinn, The Modern Problem-Solving Court Movement:  Domination of Dis-
course and Untold Stories of Criminal Justice Reform, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 57, 62-68 
(2009) (noting concerns of the criminal defense bar relating to problem-solving 
courts, and questioning the courts’ efficacy); Jane M. Spinak, Reforming Family Court:  
Getting It Right between Rhetoric and Reality, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 33-38 (2009) 
(questioning the efficacy of problem-solving family courts); Developments in the Law--
Alternatives to Incarceration, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1863, 1917-19 (1998) (expressing con-
cern over the lack of procedural safeguards in drug courts). 
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agglomerations of all kinds relentlessly lobby chief judges and other 
local officials to create courts for whatever is the latest problem-
solving fad for the latest self-described victims’ group. 
But it’s not just politics.  Problem-solving courts of all types have 
infected appointed judiciaries as much as elected ones.4  Drug courts 
have even found their way into the federal system, albeit belatedly.5
Another explanation is darker.  Drug courts in particular are 
popular with judges and with judicial bureaucrats because drug courts 
typically drive case numbers up, and come budget time there is noth-
ing sweeter to a chief judge than a big fat caseload.  Filings go up be-
cause most drug courts trigger a phenomenon called net-widening: 
the existence of the drug court itself stimulates more case filings.  The 
mechanisms of net-widening are not always clear, and they probably 
differ across jurisdictions and maybe even over time.  But the effects 
can be significant.  In Denver, where I preside, drug filings almost 
tripled one year after the institution of our drug court compared with 
one year before.
 
6  A big part of the net-widening phenomenon is pret-
ty straightforward:  police and prosecutors are no longer trying to 
detect crime; they are trolling for patients.  Arrests that might never 
be made in the shadow of a truth-finding system get regularly made 
when guilt and truth are irrelevant.  Cases that prosecutors would 
never have filed if they actually had to be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt are regularly filed in therapeutic systems, where a not guilty 
plea is called denial, and proof is all back-loaded to the question of 
whether a defendant complied with required therapy.7
My guess is that the uptick in case filings is more than offset by a 
decrease in the time the therapeutic judge devotes to each case.  
That’s because a cadre of other actors typically helps the therapeutic 
judge push the cases through, from magistrates and designated court 
staff, to designated probation staff, and even to counsel themselves, 
who are forced to abandon their traditional adversary role to become 
 
 
4
There are drug courts in all fifty states, thus including the states that are purely 
appointment states.  Drug Courts, NAT’L INST. JUST., http://nij.gov/topics/courts/drug-
courts/welcome.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).  As of June 30, 2010, a total of 2559 
drug courts existed in the United States,.  Id. 
5
As of June 30, 2010, there were fifty-seven federal drug courts.  Id.    
6
See Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, supra note 1, at 1502 n.260 (showing that 
drug filings grew from 1047 in 1993, the first full year before implementation of our 
drug court, to 2661 in 1995, the first full year after implementation of our drug court). 
7
See generally NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 201-04. 
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part of the treatment “team.”8
But these explanations are not just unduly cynical, they probably 
miss the heart of the matter.  I suspect that the deepest and most 
complete explanation of the problem-solving phenomenon is pretty 
simple:  every day we see people in our courtrooms with profound 
problems, and we naturally want to help.  We know that punishment 
alone does not solve any of these problems and that the crimes that 
bring these people into our courtrooms seem to be the tip of an ice-
berg of dysfunction.  It is terribly tempting for judges to use the coer-
cive power of the judicial branch to try to help the people who come 
before us.  I cannot count the numbers of times I have heard treat-
ment court judges say things like, “We finally have their attention; now 
we can help them.”  I know many colleagues, both in my own court 
and in courts across the country, who believe sincerely and passionate-
ly in the curative power of their therapeutic mission; indeed, this 
movement owes its incubation and sustenance to a core of truly re-
markable and dedicated judges. 
  All of this means that, despite the fact 
that drug court judges spend untold hours cajoling and cheerleading 
their “clients” toward the promised land of recovery, their time per 
case probably goes down significantly because they have so much help 
from everyone else, help that judges in regular problem-creating courts 
do not have.  More cases, less judge-time per case.  What looks better to 
a chief judge fighting other chief judges for shares of the budget pie? 
But that doesn’t make them right.  In fact, if the simple human 
desire to help explains the growth of the therapeutic jurisprudence 
movement, then it strangely fails to explain the movement’s sharp li-
mitations.  There are no aggravated robbery courts where we try to 
solve the social problems of armed robbers, or community rape courts 
where we encourage rapists to apologize to victims so we can heal the 
community’s wounds.9
 
8
For an engaging and thoughtful discussion of the ethical issues this presents to 
defense counsel, see Boldt, supra note 
  We do not give pedophiles serial probation 
and community service until they either reform or call our bluff.  Our 
veterans courts do not seem too interested in veterans who kidnap 
and murder.  Why the oddly truncated reach of a movement with such 
seemingly unbounded and hopeful activism? 
3, at 1286-1300. 
9
I should clarify that I am not talking about so-called “reentry courts,” which ad-
dress the problem of reintegration rather than the social dislocation that caused of-
fenders to commit the crime in the first place.  I think such courts are great, though 
they are really just making up for what corrections officials should be doing. 
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It is not enough just to say that problem-solving courts are to jus-
tice what the broken-windows theory is to policing,10 though there are 
some tempting similarities.  It is entirely plausible that cleaning up 
low-level crime might have a positive impact on more serious crimes, 
whether that low-level cleanup comes from police activity or therapeu-
tic court activity.11  But that is very much not the goal of most problem-
solving courts.12
And that is one of the impossible challenges of the movement.  
No self-respecting treatment judge would be so smug as to claim to be 
able, let alone authorized, to solve all of modern society’s ills.  We 
cannot order teenagers to refrain from getting pregnant at thirteen, 
or fathers and mothers to avoid abandoning their children, or schools 
to teach, or parents to parent.  But once all these social failures coa-
lesce into an individual drug user or graffiti artist or shoplifter, some 
judges suddenly think they can “fix” the individuals whose behavior is 
a product of these failed systems. 
  To their credit, they do not set out to save the world 
or even their own communities.  The problems they are interested in 
solving are on a much smaller scale.  They are just trying to save the 
people who come before them from the impacts of the social prob-
lems that brought them into court—problems that if left unsolved will 
just keep them coming back. 
I chuckle at problem-solving enthusiasts who claim they are get-
ting at the “causes” of the problems, while we in problem-creating 
courts are just dealing with the “effects.”  It is simply not true.  One 
link in the causal chain does not a cause make.  No teen court judge 
 
10
 The broken-windows theory postulates that reducing the incidence of low-level 
crimes like vandalism will have norm-setting signaling effects that will reduce more se-
rious crimes.  See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, The Police and Neighborhood Safe-
ty:  Broken Windows, ATLANTIC, March 1982, at 29, 34.   
11
The broken-windows theory is not without its detractors.  See, e.g., Bernard E. 
Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows:  New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City 
Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 304-07 (2006) (arguing that, under the bro-
ken-windows approach, serious crime simply relocates).  Though therapeutic courts 
are famous for their grossly overly optimistic recidivism statistics, I am unaware of any 
studies that claim they also have a positive impact on the frequency of more serious 
crimes, which may itself say something about whether the proponents of therapeutic 
jurisprudence really see themselves as broken-windows warriors. 
12
For example, here’s the Minnesota Judicial Branch’s published statement about 
the purposes of its problem-solving courts:  The problem-solving court “works closely 
with prosecutors, public defenders, probation officers, social workers, and other justice 
system partners to develop a strategy that will pressure an offender into completing a 
treatment program and abstaining from repeating the behaviors that brought them to 
court.”  Problem-Solving Courts, MINN. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.mncourts.gov/?page= 
626 (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).  
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thinks he can solve the aching loneliness inherent in adolescence, 
even though a nice judicial pep talk might make everyone feel good 
for a while.  Even the boldest of veterans court judges do not think 
they have a mandate to end war in an effort to stop war-related post-
traumatic stress disorder.  These courts are dealing exclusively in ef-
fects, not in causes; they just happen to be focusing on a different set 
of effects than the one that brought their patient to them (and I 
might add, the only one that gives the court the power to act).  But I 
also think that this claim about dealing with “causes” may be the key 
to understanding our addiction to problem-solving courts. 
I.  THE PSYCHOLEGAL ERROR 
My friend Professor Stephen Morse coined a fantastic term—the 
“fundamental psycholegal error”—to describe the powerful tempta-
tion we all seem to have to equate cause with excuse.13
True excuse, of the insanity variety, involves the brain’s profound 
loss of rationality.
  But of course 
cause is not excuse.  Everything has a cause, and every cause has an 
antecedent cause.  If cause were excuse, then all wrongs would be ex-
cused.  But nothing about the chain of causation, precisely because 
such a chain lies behind every action, can ever in and of itself inform 
us about responsibility.  Knowing that the defendant was abused and 
tormented by her spouse makes us feel like we understand the mind 
that decided to kill him while he was sleeping, but understanding that 
such a killing has such a “cause” does not excuse the killing any more 
than understanding that you needed money for your heroin habit 
excuses you from robbing the grocery store. 
14  And a “cause” is seldom so rationality-distorting as 
to be an excuse.  Andrea Yates was excused because her actions were 
caused by a profoundly distorted view of the world—her children would 
be consigned to hell if she did not kill them.15
 
13
Stephen J. Morse, Excusing and the New Excuse Defenses:  A Legal and Conceptual 
Review, 23 CRIME & JUST. 329, 350-53 (1998). 
  When is sheer anger, 
fear, or craving so rationality-distorting as to amount to an excuse?  
There is no easy answer to that question, except to say that the law’s an-
14
See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente between Le-
gal Insanity and Mens Rea:  Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1071, 1096 (2007) (“People are found legally insane because they lack rational ca-
pacity or, more controversially, because they cannot conform their behavior to the 
requirements of law.”).   
15
Jury Finds Yates Insane, Not Guilty, HOUS. CHRON., July 26, 2006, at A1. 
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swer is “almost never.”16  And so far that has been a wise answer, because 
to engage any more broadly in this inquiry risks the problem that none 
of us really knows what “causes” any of our decisions, and that all of us 
could therefore claim to be relieved of responsibility altogether.17
So what has all of this to do with problem-solving courts?  Every-
thing, since the “problems” that problem-solving courts are trying to 
solve are the immediately antecedent causes of criminal behavior.  In 
problem-creating courts like mine, we just punish people for their 
wrongs.
 
18
This is not only a wholly unprecedented expansion of the doctrine 
of excuse, but it is all being done quite silently in the alternate un-
iverse that is therapeutic jurisprudence.  Treatment courts do not ad-
mit that they are “excusing” their “clients,” but that is exactly what 
they are doing, particularly in courts where, as is very common, the 
treatment component is enforced by way of conditions to a deferred 
  But problem-solving courts try to get at least one level dee-
per in the cause-and-effect chain, and then treat that cause instead of 
punishing its effect, because in problem-solving courts the antecedent 
cause excuses the crime.  Problem-solving courts literally institutional-
ize the psycholegal error.  When Johnny tags the local church, he is 
not just tagging a church.  He is acting out because of something 
going on in his life.  When our problem-solving courts discover that 
something—dysfunctional family, drugs, problems at school, all of the 
above—and Johnny takes steps to cure himself, albeit with a little bit 
of coercion, we excuse the tagging. 
 
16
Short of insanity, that answer is embedded, on the excuse side, largely in what is 
left of the doctrine of irresistible impulse, and on the justification side, in doctrines 
like self-defense and duress.   
17
This problem of the end of responsibility is coming to a head, so to speak, as 
neuroscientists dig deeper and deeper into the neuronal chain of causation.  Some 
legal philosophers have argued that what neuroscience will ultimately discover is that 
none of us is a responsible moral agent and none of us can therefore hold anyone else 
morally responsible, though most admit that we should nevertheless remain steadfast 
in holding to the illusion.  See, e.g., DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS 
WILL 334 (2002).  Thankfully, the law has held fast to its compatibalist traditions.  A 
neuroscientist once complained to me about how I could punish anyone for anything, 
when we all knew that our decisions were just neurons all the way down and that no 
one could really help themselves.  I replied  that I in turn could not help myself.  He 
did not seem satisfied, but in fact there is a rich psychological, primatological, and now 
even neuroscientific literature suggesting that we all have powerful and evolved in-
stincts to punish.  See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Third-Party Punishment and So-
cial Norms, 25 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 63, 85 (2004).  
18
 Yes, yes, even problem-creating courts engage in the fiction of probation, which 
many of my drug court friends would claim is just a less informed version of treatment 
courts.  No doubt there is a continuum between the rehabilitative aspects of ordinary 
probation and its most robust form as a treatment court. 
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judgment.  When the miscreant successfully completes treatment, we 
absolve him completely of his responsibility, because you see he did 
not commit a wrong; it was those other causes that did it. 
Which brings us to the puzzle of addiction.  Like most aspects of 
human behavior, and especially human decisionmaking, very little is 
really known about the neurology of addiction.  Yes, neuroimaging 
has made important inroads—there seems to be no doubt that addic-
tion is bound up with the brain’s risk/reward circuits, and more par-
ticularly with problems in the ways that various neurotransmitters, es-
pecially dopamine, give us our sense of pleasure.19  An addict needs 
more and more of his drug because his dopamine is responding less 
and less.20  Genes have also been discovered that reduce the effect of 
dopamine, confirming that there can be a genetic predisposition to 
addiction.21
In the case of the dopaminergic model of addiction, the problem 
is that these same dopamine-driven risk/reward circuits are involved 
in all of our decisionmaking behaviors.
  But as is often the case with discoveries about the brain, 
what we learn about a narrow area seems only to open more ques-
tions in larger ones. 
22
 
19
See generally Steven E. Hyman et al., Neural Mechanisms of Addiction:  The Role of 
Reward-Related Learning and Memory, 29 ANN. REV. NEUROSCI. 565, 570-75 (2006) (ana-
lyzing the central role of dopamine in understanding addictive behavior).  
  Every time we decide to lis-
ten to pleasing music or eat a bag of potato chips or have an orgasm, 
these same circuits not only gin up our dopamine in the same basic 
way that anticipating a snort of cocaine does, but there also seems to 
be the same tolerance phenomenon of increased use requiring in-
creased amounts of dopamine for the same kick.  We get “addicted” in 
some fundamental way to every pleasurable experience we have, 
which of course, within limits, makes perfect evolutionary sense.  It is 
20
See Nora D. Volkow et al., Role of Dopamine, the Frontal Cortex and Memory Circuits 
in Drug Addiction:  Insight from Imaging Studies, 78 NEUROBIOLOGY OF LEARNING & MEM-
ORY 610, 611 (2002) (noting that drug addiction may result from the repeated pertur-
bation of the dopamine system).  
21
See B. Le Foll et al, Dopamine D3 Receptor Agents as Potential New Medications for 
Drug Addiction, 15 EUR. PSYCHIATRY 140, 140-41 (2000) (analyzing the effect of defects 
in the D3 receptor gene). 
22
Marc N. Potenza, Should Addictive Disorders Include Non-Substance-Related Condi-
tions?, 101 ADDICTION (Supp. 1) 142, 142, 148 (2006).  On the other hand, there are 
indications that the dopamine released by anticipated drug use is released in a 
slightly different location than the dopamine released in anticipation of nondrug 
behaviors.  Valentina Bassareo et al, Differential Adaptive Properties of Accumbens Shell 
Dopamine Responses to Ethanol as a Drug and as a Motivational Stimulus, 17 EUR. J. NEU-
ROSCI. 1465, 1471 (2003). 
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nature’s way of helping us remember certain experiences and increas-
ing the likelihood we will repeat them, since things like having or-
gasms would have been really important evolutionary things to do. 
Somehow, most of our brains are able to maintain a satisfying level 
of pleasure without having to overindulge.  But others of us, across a 
whole array of pleasurable behaviors, not just using drugs, and also at 
different times in our lives depending on factors such as our levels of 
stress, need more and more indulgence to maintain the same level of 
dopamine-driven satisfaction.  We need to eat a whole bag of potato 
chips, or have eight drinks instead of two.  At the extreme, addicts are 
not getting any pleasure at all from their drug of choice—they just 
need it to get to sleep or avoid convulsions.  For them, the reward part 
of the risk/reward circuit has become so muted that they cannot get 
their levels of dopamine up to pleasurable amounts, no matter how 
much of their drug they take.  Their pleasure circuits have become 
dopamine-starved pain circuits.23
But because we know so little about what really makes cocaine dif-
ferent from, say, sex or potato chips, we likewise know very little about 
when one kind of behavior should be treated as a “choice” for pur-
poses of responsibility and another kind treated like the product of an 
excused cause—the excuse of addiction. 
 
The law has always been conflicted over these difficult concepts of 
choice and compulsion.  Voluntary intoxication is traditionally not a 
defense, either affirmatively or to negate general mens rea, even 
though the drunk killer’s state of mind is probably the same whether 
he is a teetotaler and achieved that state of mind from his first-ever 
drink or he is an alcoholic and achieved that state of mind after twelve 
drinks.  The law, in its wisdom, has generally recognized that to 
excuse an addict’s drug use as “involuntary” might open up the flood-
gates of excuse and risk the end of responsibility.  Even modern law, 
after having been schooled for decades about the “disease” of addic-
tion, does not recognize it as an excuse, instinctively and quite rightly 
appreciating what neuroscience only now seems to be confirming:  
that all “decisions” are a complex integration of emotion, cognition, 
risk-taking and pleasure-seeking, that addiction may just be a way of 
describing one end of that continuum, and that without knowing 
 
23
For a comprehensive, current, and enjoyably accessible introduction to the neu-
robiology of addiction, see DAVID J. LINDEN, THE COMPASS OF PLEASURE:  HOW OUR 
BRAINS MAKE FATTY FOODS, ORGASM, EXERCISE, MARIJUANA, GENEROSITY, VODKA, 
LEARNING, AND GAMBLING FEEL SO GOOD (2011).       
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more about the neurology of decisionmaking, excusing one end of 
that continuum may require us to excuse the whole of it. 
So when it comes to the criminal decisions of addicted minds, the 
law has remained fairly unimpressed with the therapeutic movement, 
and largely resistant to the lure of the psycholegal error.  When an 
addict rapes a coworker, his addiction is not the “cause” of the rape—
even if we could be metaphysically sure that the rape never would 
have happened if he were sober—and it is almost never an excuse.24
II.  LEGALIZATION BY JUDICIAL FIAT 
  
And yet, when that same addict is charged with the crime of possess-
ing the drug to which he is addicted, the addiction suddenly becomes 
the cause of his possession, and in therapeutic courts a complete 
excuse, as long as he plays the game and responds to our treatment.  
But if the addict in both cases does not “choose” to use, then how can 
the addict-rapist’s use be ignored under the rubric of voluntary intox-
ication?  In both cases, under the therapeutic model, the addict had 
no choice but to use.  Yet our problem-solving courts excuse the crime 
of continued use but not the crime of drug-induced rape.  Why? 
The answer seems clear:  therapeutic courts treat an addict’s drug 
use as “involuntary” when considering the crime of drug use, but “vo-
luntary” when considering any sort of more serious general intent 
crime, simply because therapeutic courts do not believe drug use 
should be a crime.  That is a perfectly reasonable belief, and in fact is 
an approach that seems to be gaining traction with many thoughtful 
people.  But of course it is not typically the judicial branch that de-
cides what should and should not be a crime.  Despite the constant 
haranguing about of the disease theory of addiction, our legislatures 
have by and large remained unmoved.  Drug use remains a crime, but 
it has been functionally decriminalized by a segment of the judiciary 
that simply disagrees with that approach. 
The same is true for almost all manner of problem-solving courts.  
These courts are not just meant to treat the underlying problem that 
caused the minor crime, they are in fact meant only to treat the under-
lying problem and not the crime itself.  Thus, when defendants in 
problem-solving courts are punished, they generally are punished for 
failing our proffered treatment, not for engaging in the underlying 
act.  Here again, judges have decided that shoplifting or vandalism or 
 
24
There may be extreme cases where an addiction has progressed to the point of other 
serious and potentially excusable mental disorders, like substance-induced psychoses. 
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other low-level crimes are simply not serious enough to warrant pu-
nishment on their own, even though legislative bodies have crimina-
lized these activities.  Like police and prosecutors, these courts do not 
care about the crimes that bring their defendants to them; the crimes 
are just a useful vehicle by which the court can gain these diseased 
people’s attention, and, by using the threat of punishment, try to cure 
their social problems.25
So the answer to the troubling question of why there are no prob-
lem-solving kidnapping or pedophilia courts is that there is just not a 
large body of judges that believes kidnapping or pedophilia should be 
legalized.  That is, all this judicial falderol about how nothing we are 
doing seems to be working, and how judges need to be more proactive 
in helping their communities, is largely just a cover for legalization.  
When problem-solving judges say traditional courts do not work for 
some of these special crimes, what they are really saying is that crimina-
lization is not working.  They may or may not be right about that, but 
they are not members of the branch authorized to make that judgment. 
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25
Not all problem-solving courts are so purely therapeutic.  Some mete out pu-
nishment in parallel to their therapeutic efforts.  I applaud those courts.  Most DUI 
courts are of this variety, presumably because few, if any, judges think driving drunk 
should be legalized or excused by addiction—even though, right across the hall, a he-
roin addiction is certainly viewed as excusing the crime of heroin possession. 
